ࡱ> CEB +bjbj .2Z"N #3CCCWWW8 W:B$|rCCCCC`]JB@W% 0:XC$vTTD/R: : Regeneration friend or foe? - issues with national congestion pricing Professor Ron McQuaid, Director of the Employment Research Institute and member of the Transport Research Institute, Napier University, Edinburgh July 2005 McQuaid, R.W. (2005) Regeneration friend or foe? - issues with congestion pricing, Scotregen Newsletter, Issue 31, pp. 4-5, Autumn. There has been support for the Minister for Transport, Alistair Darling, as he took the major step of proposing trials for a national Road User or Congestion Charging scheme. According to a Department for Transport feasibility study, the cost to drivers could vary from a low of 2p per mile up to 1.34 for congested roads. But what are its implications of national congestion pricing for regeneration? The Congestion problem With the remorselessly growing number of road vehicles and ever worsening congestion there are limited options for government. Land use changes take considerable time to take effect, and it is still common for retail, leisure, employment, and even new Council offices, to be located in areas most easily accessed by cars rather than public transport. Some building of new roads may help in specific circumstances, but even the most diehard pro-road lobbyist recognises that this will not completely solve congestion and may even generate extra traffic in some circumstances. Raising fuel prices have only limited effects on car usage and making public transport more attractive and affordable has a long way to go. For decades many economists and policy analysts have argued that we need to manage the existing road infrastructure better. This basically means making more efficient use of the road space we have by reducing car use during peak periods and moving some trips to less congested times of the day or onto other modes of transport, such as public transport or cycling. Implications for regeneration As has been discussed before in Regeneration, there are grave difficulties for local areas in introducing congestion charging. So national support makes it more likely that local initiatives may get off the ground. However, there are some important regeneration implications of the current proposals from the Department for Transport. First, the introduction of national congestion pricing will influence the location of land uses and regeneration, and potentially encourage both the greater dispersion and concentration of activities. If there is a relatively high level of congestion, and hence congestion charge, in an area then there may be a pressure for employers, retailers, customers and others to move to areas with generally light traffic levels (or at least light outside of rush hour). These will usually be less urbanised places. There may also be a contradictory pressure as firms etc. may move to areas with excellent public transport access (usually city centres) as public transport users will not pay the congestion charge and should have faster journeys. Squeezed between these trends, may be areas with relatively high congestion levels and charges but inadequate public transport alternatives, including many urban regeneration areas outside city centres. However, small local shops (even if owned by one of the major chains) may make a comeback for non-car based shopping. Similarly there may be a move to longer opening hours as people shop at less road-congested periods. There will be the usual delicate balance between the convenience and (financial and other) costs of customers accessing them, and the size of the catchment areas for a shop or leisure facility (so a large potential customer base will still keep many shops in an apparently less attractive location). But the broad overall trend may be towards a combination of dispersion of facilities to lower density areas (or where there is a large amount of road infrastructure and hence less congestion) and/or towards central areas with high public transport access. It will be important whether the proposed road user charging schemes are based upon absolute or relative levels of congestion, for example, upon the actual time taken to travel over a particular piece of road or how long it takes to travel a mile compared to a different or standard road. If the government is to maintain (or expand) income from the road user charging, then the pricing in an area may be based upon relative congestion rather than just on absolute levels of congestion. If congestion falls nationwide by the same relative amount, then it is possible that no area would see a cut in congestion prices, otherwise total revenue to the government would fall. Hence if congestion falls more in, say, city centres but stays the same in neighbouring regeneration areas, the charges could rise in those areas. So the basis of the road user charge is important. A second related issue is the redistribution of taxes, and incomes, due to the shift from vehicle excise duties and fuel taxes to congestion charges. Everyone will pay less petrol tax and excise duty, but this will be more than compensated for in congested areas like the southeast, where drivers there will pay high levels of road user charges. In less congested regions of the UK, particularly to rural areas, they will pay less overall. However, within each region there would also be a shift in overall taxes and charges towards more congested, generally urban, areas and away from less congested and rural areas, even though income levels might be higher in some of these less congested areas. The third issue concerns sustainability. The initial indications from the Minister were that there would be no distinction between different vehicles, so a large fuel guzzling car, taking up a lot of road space, would pay the same as a small fuel-efficient car. If, as is being suggested, all or most vehicle excise duties and fuel taxes are removed, then this will be a major reduction in incentives to have more environmentally friendly vehicles. It is easy to see that from a pragmatic political perspective, there may be a need to argue that congestion pricing replaces other taxes completely (at least in the early days) but this will cause potentially significant environmental concerns. Fourth, is the issue concerning the capacity to improve public transport if the road user charging initiative is successful. It is ironic that there have been recent suggestions that rail fares at peak times should rise in some cities to help alleviate overcrowding. Yet one result of road user charging would be to increase peak hour public transport demand. It would be absurd, and counter productive for road user pricing, if alternatives to car use simply increased their prices. It is essential that public transport prices be restrained and capacity increased, especially at peak times, in congested areas following the introduction of road user charges. Fifth is the fundamental issue of equity. Currently road space is rationed by time. We all equally sit equally fuming at the delays. Road pricing primarily rations by price, with the result is that those who put a lower value on a particular journey will make it at a less congested time, on public transport, foot or cycle, or not at all. However, there is a high correlation between how much you value a journey and your income, or whether someone else, like you employer, is paying for it. So those in a company car, or wealthier people, will have access to quicker peak hour journeys, but those on lower incomes will disproportionately be the ones who have to change their behaviour and drive less at congested times. On the other hand less congested roads will improve the speed and reliability of buses, used by a large proportion of the lowest income people. There are many other issues only partly considered by the feasibility study, from civil liberties and data protection to issues such as how to ensure that non-UK vehicle drivers pay the full road user charge, otherwise they may simply add to congestion (together with the growth of a grey market in foreign registered cars). The technical problems of a nation road user charging scheme are huge (e.g. how do people know sufficiently in advance so they can alter their journey patterns, and there will be serious IT problems of a scheme covering tens of millions of vehicles and journeys each day). Despite the less than perfect experience of accuracy in Londons congestion charging schemes, it can only be hoped that these are overcome appropriately. Although these are all serious issues, that any proposal for congestion pricing will need to deal with, they may not be insurmountable if explicitly dealt with in the early stages of design of any scheme. It is time to put regeneration on the agenda for road user charging.  Transport Secretary Alistair Darling on 9 June 2005 Speech outlining the benefits of road pricing. http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_roads/documents/page/dft_roads_038153.hcsp  DfT (2005) Feasibility of Road Pricing in the UK. London. http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_roads/documents/divisionhomepage/029798.hcsp     9 M h i j   [ a """c&h&i&o&Z*[*\*++++++++++++++ƾjhl Uhl hOJQJ^Jh5\mH sH hmH sH h6]mH sH  h6]jh0JUhv|hPJhv|h6] hv|hh.FGj k l     { | WXvwvw~$a$$a$$a$gd$a$Z [ ""S&T&E)F)X*Y*Z*+++++++++++++$a$,1h. 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